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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, most Americans read that the federal government spent about $2.7 trillion
dollars. 1 In fact, the government spent more than $3.7 trillion. 2
As the tremendous scope of the nation’s coming fiscal crisis has become more apparent, 3
scholars and experts from across the political spectrum have focused on developing reforms to
maintain budgetary stability. But in focusing on the looming federal deficits and the need for
reform, politicians and policy experts have by and large directed most of their efforts at
proposing changes to Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. 4 While the expected growth in
these three programs due both to the retirement of the Baby Boom generation and the rapid pace
of health care inflation make these programs undoubtedly the greatest driver of projected future
deficits, 5 another significant and disturbing fiscal trend has largely flown under the radar. 6 Since
the most recent major tax code rewrite in 1986, Congress has increasingly and stealthily used socalled “tax expenditures” to accomplish its policy objectives in lieu of annual appropriations.

1

Congressional Budget Office, Historical Budget Data, http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.shtml (last visited
February 24, 2009).
2
See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TAX EXPENDITURES:
TRENDS AND CRITIQUES 22 (2008), available at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL33641 (estimating the revenue
losses from tax expenditures at $1.034 billion). See also CHYE-CHING HUANG & HANNAH SHAW, CTR. FOR BUDGET
& POL’Y PRIORITIES, NEW ANALYSIS SHOWS “TAX EXPENDITURES” OVERALL ARE COSTLY AND REGRESSIVE:
FINDINGS HIGHLIGHT NEED TO RESTRAIN TAX SUBSIDIES AS PART OF SOLUTION TO LONG-TERM BUDGET PROBLEMS
1-2 (2009), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2662 (estimating the total cost of individual tax
expenditures only at over $700 billion, when incorporating interaction effects). See infra Part II.A for a discussion
on the practical challenges to estimating the costs of tax expenditures.
3
See, e.g., U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE NATION’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK, GAO-09-405SP
(2009) [hereinafter “GAO FISCAL OUTLOOK”].
4
See, e.g., Ezra Klein, How Entitlement Reform Became Health Reform, AMER. PROSPECT, February 23, 2009,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=how_entitlement_reform_became_health_reform (“It's testament to how
deeply the idea of an entitlement crisis has embedded itself in Washington that news that Obama planned a "fiscal
accountability summit" was immediately taken as proof by The Washington Post that he was readying a frontal
assault on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.”).
5
GAO FISCAL OUTLOOK, supra note 3, at 1.
6
See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX
EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 47, GAO-05690 (2005) [hereinafter “GAO TAX EXPENDITURES”].

2

A tax expenditure is an exclusion from gross income, a deduction, or a credit designed to
accomplish a specific policy aim and which causes the government to take in fewer tax revenues
than it would otherwise. Tax expenditures are familiar to every American taxpayer, even if they
may not realize their budgetary significance. Among the largest tax expenditures are the
deductions of home mortgage interest, the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance
coverage from gross income, and deductions for charitable giving. 7 But other tax expenditures
are more obviously special interest giveaways, such as the complicated tax subsidies for the
timber industry 8 or percentage depletion allowances for natural resource extraction. 9 While the
mortgage and health insurance tax provisions are so familiar to average Americans that their
existence may seem harmless, economists and commentators have long recognized that tax
expenditures are in fact, if not in name, a form of budgetary entitlement. 10 Just like Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, these provisions give direct financial benefits to certain
Americans, cost the government money (in the form of forgone revenue), and do not require
annual authorization or appropriation.
These silent spending programs account for the difference between true budgetary reality
and the federal spending total reported on the front page of the newspaper. Make no mistake—
subsidizing a particular taxpayer’s activity through a tax deduction is no different from a

7

HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 4, Table 1.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §631(b) (2006); I.R.C. §194 (2006). See also THE CENTURY FOUND., BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND:
THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES 23 (2002) (listing the timber
subsidies as one of their “dirty dozen” tax expenditures that should be eliminated); Michael P. Ettlinger, Our Bucket
is Leaking: Tax Expenditures and Loopholes in the Federal Budget, in BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND: THE REPORT OF
THE CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES 131-33 (The Century Found. ed., 2002)
(describing many timber tax breaks).
9
See I.R.C. §613 (2006). See also Ettlinger, supra note 8, 129-30 (describing the oil and gas tax breaks including
percentage depletion).
10
Indeed, for this reason former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan prefers to call tax expenditures “tax
entitlements.” HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 1. See also HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 2 (“[T]ax expenditures
are another form of entitlement spending.”); ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS
172 (3d ed. 2007) (“Tax expenditures are a form of entitlement.”).
8
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budgetary standpoint than writing that taxpayer a check. 11 And yet, because of the underlying
structure of the tax code and because the federal budget process treats tax expenditures as hidden
entitlements rather than as direct spending, the use of tax expenditures to advance social policy
leads to deeply troubling consequences for both fiscal discipline and income inequality.
This paper begins in Part I by discussing trends in the use of tax expenditures to achieve
policy objectives, and describes briefly how political incentives perversely encourage tax
expenditures over direct spending. Part II surveys the many criticisms of tax expenditures,
including their lack of transparency and accountability and their intrinsic regressivity. Part III
discusses possible ways to define tax expenditures—a threshold question before any structural
reform can be undertaken. Finally, Part IV contains a list of potential budget procedural reforms
that can reduce the temptation for Congress to continually expand the size of the tax expenditure
budget. Some of these proposals are new ideas tailored to the current political realities, and
others are adopted from old or abandoned reform proposals that deserve a new life in the face of
the nation’s pressing fiscal challenges.

I. TRENDS IN TAX EXPENDITURES
In fiscal year 2007, tax expenditures cost the federal government over $1 trillion—or
7.6% of GDP—in forgone revenues. 12 If all these tax expenditures were eliminated, the

11

Or, as Prof. Westmoreland explains, “whether taxes are collected and spent on widgets or whether widgetpurchasers can deduct widget costs from their taxes, federal money is used to reduce or pay the costs of widgets.”
Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555, 1568 (2007). See
also Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending – Does it Make a Difference?, NAT’L TAX J., September 2000, at 361, 363
[hereinafter “Toder, Tax Cuts”], describing how it would be theoretically possible to structure the entire defense
budget as a tax cut (i.e., by giving defense contractors a refundable tax credit for supplying weapons to the
government for “free”) or to partially pay schoolteachers with a tax cut (as was once proposed in California).
12
HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 22. Tax expenditures for individuals (i.e., excluding tax benefits for businesses)
totaled $760.5 billion in FY2007. HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 1. But see infra Part II.A (describing potential
complications with estimating tax expenditures).
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government could cut all tax rates by about 37% with the added revenue. 13 This growth has been
fueled by an expansion in the number of tax expenditures from 60 in 1972 to 170 and 2007. 14
Between 1980 and 2007, the share of total government support distributed through tax
expenditures increased from 23% to 27%. 15 Tax expenditures have grown faster than the
economy in most years since data began being collected in 1967. 16 But this modest percentage
increase is misleading because the share of government support for health care delivered through
tax expenditures has been decreasing due to the dramatic growth in the costs of government
health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. 17 In every other functional category of
spending analyzed by the Congressional Research Service, the government is increasingly reliant
on tax expenditures to accomplish its policy objectives. 18
These trends are not surprising. Tax expenditures are politically attractive because they
enable political leaders to “have their cake and eat it too”19 by “appear[ing] to reduce spending
and taxes, while at the same time pursing an activist policy that promotes popular programs.” 20
Alternatively, tax expenditures can be attractive means for accomplishing unpopular policy
objectives because tax expenditures are less visible to the public. 21

13

Ettlinger, supra note 8, at 103. Note the rates could be cut by 37%, not by 37 percentage points.
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 4
(Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-37-08.pdf [hereinafter “JCT RECONSIDERATION”].
15
HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 14-15.
16
Eric Toder, Evaluating Tax Incentives as a Tool for Social and Economic Policy, in BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND:
THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES 39 (The Century Found. ed.,
2002) [hereinafter “Toder, Evaluating”].
17
HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, 16.
18
Id. at 15, fig.2. In CRS’s “Commerce and Housing” category, for instance, virtually 100% of government support
came through the tax code in 2007, up from about 90% in 1980. This category includes deductions for home
mortgage interest and other tax subsidies for housing.
19
CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 13.
20
Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 361.
21
See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 69 (“Because tax provisions are not as visible in the budget as
spending programs, there is an incentive for policymakers to use tax provisions rather than spending programs to
accomplish programmatic ends.”).
14
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II. CRITICISMS OF TAX EXPENDITURES
A. Transparency
As the opening statistic suggested, because tax expenditures do not appear in reported
outlay totals, the true size of government and the true scope of the government commitment to
various policy objectives is hidden. 22 But even if an attempt were made to explicitly count tax
expenditures in the annual budget outlays totals, 23 the cost of a tax expenditure is inherently
uncertain. For example, while it is easy enough for the IRS to sum the total amount of special
deductions claimed by the timber industry,24 repealing the deduction would not result in the
government collecting exactly this sum in revenue because the repeal of the deductions would, at
least in theory, cause fewer companies to engage in lumber production and perhaps to find other
means to shelter income. 25 By contrast, the cost of a discretionary spending program that directly
subsidized lumber would be quite easy to calculate—simply the sum of all checks written by the
treasury.
Additionally, eliminating two separate tax expenditures that cost the government $100
million each would not necessarily generate $200 million in additional revenue for two reasons.
First, because taxpayers claim individual deductions only if the sum of such deductions exceeds
the standard deduction, eliminating one tax expenditure may induce many taxpayers to instead
claim the standard deduction, at which point those taxpayers would not see their liability reduced
if a second deduction were also eliminated. 26 Second, eliminating the first deduction may push
some taxpayers into a higher bracket, increasing the revenue that would be gained by eliminating

22

CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 11.
See infra Part IV.C.
24
But see infra Part III.
25
See JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 5.
26
HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 7; GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 19.
23
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the second deduction. 27 Without a definite understanding of the cost of a tax expenditure, it can
be even more difficult to assess whether the provision is worth the benefits to society. 28
Tax expenditures also obscure the administrative costs of achieving a policy objective.
Whereas in a direct expenditure program, administrative costs are typically directly accounted
for as part of any appropriation, the costs of “administering” a particular tax expenditure is
inextricably mixed with the overall cost of tax enforcement. 29 In other words, adding a new tax
deduction to the Code does, at least in theory, incrementally increase IRS enforcement costs,
either by directly requiring more IRS auditors or by causing the IRS to trade-off its limited
enforcement resources to administer the new break. 30 But exactly how much a given tax
expenditure costs to administer can never be known for certain, limiting the ability of Congress
to assess whether the benefits of a tax provision are worth its costs.
Finally, tax expenditures also decrease the transparency of the tax code itself by
increasing its complexity and requiring taxpayers to spend more time and effort preparing
returns, and potentially increasing the risk of fraud. In 2007, taxpayers who filled out only forms
1040A or 1040EZ spent an average of 10.4 hours completing their returns. 31 By contrast,
taxpayers who filed form 1040, which is required to take advantage of the vast majority of tax
expenditures, spent 33.5 hours on average preparing returns. 32 Increased complexity also
“endanger[s] the voluntary compliance on which tax administration depends” by creating

27

HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 7; GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 19.
See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 21. Note that, though the exact cost to government is unknown,
“the sum of tax expenditure revenue over time probably provides a good approximation of the general trend in the
effect of tax expenditures on income tax revenue…[because] it is unlikely that the bias from simply summing tax
expenditures estimates changes much from year to year.” HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis added). See
supra Part I for a discussion of general trends in tax expenditures.
29
Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 365.
30
Toder, Evaluating, supa note 16, at 56.
31
HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 14.
32
Id.
28
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taxpayer “frustration and resentment.” 33 Tax expenditures may also be more susceptible to fraud
than direct spending programs because fraud in tax expenditures is only detected through random
IRS audits, whereas direct spending programs involve individual eligibility assessments for each
applicant. 34

B. Accountability
Because tax expenditures are not annually renewed in the appropriations process like
ordinary spending, tax expenditure programs are rarely or never scrutinized for effectiveness. 35
Whereas most line items in the budget are defended in detail by the responsible agencies in
lengthy “budget justification” documents, in oversight hearings, and performance audits, tax
expenditure programs are not generally subject to such oversight. 36 Theoretically, the
Administration is required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 37 and OMB
Circular A-11 38 to perform annual evaluations of tax expenditures, but the Clinton
Administration confessed to being “unenthusiastic” about them and the Bush Administration
never performed any at all. 39 This problem is compounded by the fact that many individual
government agencies are reluctant to take responsibility for tax expenditures that arguably touch
upon their policy spheres. 40

33

CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 12.
Id. at 19.
35
Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1586.
36
See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 68-71.
37
Pub. L. 103-63 (1993).
38
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11§33.6,
PREPARATION SUBMISSION AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11/current_year/a_11_2008.pdf. Notably, the OMB circular contains
only about one-half of one page on guidance with respect to tax expenditures out of a 704-page document.
39
HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 8.
40
See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, at 67 (“OMB officials told us that some agencies see tax expenditures as closely
related to what they do and some do not, or agencies might not have enough knowledge about tax expenditures to
consider them carefully.”).
34

8

Even if comprehensive analyses were rigorously conducted, the Congressional budget
process does not place tax expenditures in direct competition with non-tax spending programs. 41
Congress virtually never considers trading off a tax expenditure for a direct spending program
(or, for that matter, vice-versa) because each type of spending takes a different path through
Congress. 42 If a performance evaluation concluded that a discretionary spending program would
be preferable to an existing tax expenditure, in most cases a bill to make such a substitution
would be required to move through multiple committees. 43 For example, first a tax writing
committee would report (and Congress would have to pass) legislation repealing the expenditure.
Then, an authorizing committee would have to authorize the new discretionary spending
program. Finally, funds for the program would have to be included in an annual appropriation
bill. By contrast, the appropriations committees can often directly trade-off funds between
programs when fashioning annual appropriations legislation. 44

C. Progressivity
If a member of Congress proposed that the government write a check to all taxpayers to
help pay for the cost of a mortgage, but stipulated that richer taxpayers with larger houses should
receive bigger checks and less well-off taxpayers should receive smaller checks (or no checks at

41

See Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1586.
JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 11, at n.9.
43
SCHICK, supra note 10, at 172; HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 9. Each of the tax-writing committees do have
jurisdiction over some spending programs, and so in theory a bill to trade-off a tax expenditure with spending on one
of those programs might be simpler. HUNGERFORD, supra note, at 9. For example, the Senate Finance Committee
has jurisdiction over both tax legislation and the Medicare program. See U.S. SENATE, 11TH CONGRESS, RULES OF
THE SENATE, RULE XXV(1)(i) (2009), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=HowCongressWorks.RulesOfSenate.
44
But see Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1582 (describing how subcommittee jurisdictional issues can “force
choices between two worthy subcommittee priorities while leaving less worthy programs outside the jurisdiction
unscathed”).
42

9

all), such a proposal would be “laughed out of Congress” 45 for its “upside-down” 46 subsidy.
And yet, the Code achieves precisely that effect by providing a deduction for interest paid on
home mortgages. 47 A similarly absurd example would be if Congress enacted a program that
paid part of college tuition costs for families making between $25,000 and $100,000 per year,
but gave no support to families making under $25,000 per year. 48 Yet this very result is achieved
through the HOPE scholarship tax credit. 49
More generally, tax expenditures like specialized deductions give greater benefits to
wealthier taxpayers for two reasons. First, a deduction or exclusion is worth more to a taxpayer
in a higher income bracket than it is to a taxpayer in a lower income bracket. 50 Second,
deductions are only valuable to a taxpayer if that taxpayer itemizes (i.e., does not use the
standard deduction). Richer taxpayers are far more likely to itemize than lower-income
taxpayers. 51 Finally, because most tax expenditure provisions are complex, they are most likely
to be taken advantage of by more sophisticated taxpayers or taxpayers who can afford to hire an
accountant. 52

45

Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 722 (1970).
46
Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 6; Ettlinger, supra note 8, at 102.
47
See I.R.C. §162(h)(2)(C) (2006).
48
CENTURY FOUN., supra note 8, at 13. See also id. at 14 (describing how the revenues lost due to the HOPE credit
could have instead been used to expand eligibility for Pell Grants); infra note 91 (describing then-candidate Barack
Obama’s tax plans, including a proposal to make the HOPE credit refundable).
49
See I.R.C. §25A(d) (2006) (adjusted gross income limitation on HOPE credit).
50
For example, a taxpayer in the 35% tax bracket who deducts $10,000 in mortgage interest sees their tax liability
decrease by $3,500, while a taxpayer in the 15% bracket sees their liability decrease by only $1,500.
51
See, e.g., ERIC J. TODER & CAROL ROSENBERG, THE TAX POLICY CENTER (URBAN INSTITUTE AND THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION), THE SHARE OF TAXPAYERS WHO ITEMIZE DEDUCTIONS IS GROWING (2007),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001054_Share_of_Taxpayers.pdf (explaining that the percentage of taxpayers
who itemized grew to 35% in 2004, but that these taxpayers were overwhelmingly above the 50th percentile in
income).
52
See HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 13.

10

Hard data confirm these general intuitions about the distributional implications of tax
expenditures. Using the Suits progressivity index, 53 CRS calculated that many of the largest tax
expenditures have severely regressive effects, with the worst offenders being the exclusion of
interest on state and local government bonds, the deductibility of state and local government
taxes, and the deductibility of charitable contributions. 54 For example, the average taxpayer
making less than $16,200 per year would realize only $7.19 in tax savings as a result of the
exclusion from income of employer-provided health insurance coverage, the average taxpayer
making between $16,200 and $31,000 would realize about $100 in savings, and the average
taxpayer making over $81,514 would realize $1,482.17 in savings. 55 More generally, all tax
expenditures combined increase after-tax income by 12.8% for taxpayers in the top 20% of the
income distribution, but by less than 7% for taxpayers in the bottom 20% of the income
distribution. 56

D. Benefits of Tax Expenditures
Despite these downsides, in certain circumstances a tax expenditure may be easier to
administer than an ordinary spending program. Using the tax code to implement policy can
obviate the need for an entirely new bureaucracy to distribute benefits—instead, the program
merely piggybacks on the existing income tax reporting and refund system. Taxpayers are
already required to file returns with the IRS, so tax expenditures do not require a “new point of

53

The Suits index is calculated by drawing Lorenz curves that relate the cumulative percentage of tax benefits with
the cumulative percentage of income and comparing the deviation from perfectly proportional benefits (i.e.,
taxpayers who collectively earn 50% of all taxable income receive 50% of all tax benefits from the deduction). The
index ranges from -1 (all benefits go to the richest) to +1 (all benefits go to the poorest). See HUNGERFORD, supra
note 2, at 23-24.
54
Id. at 19-20.
55
Id. at 21.
56
HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 2.
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contact” between the government and a program’s intended beneficiaries. 57 Tax expenditures
may be particularly efficient if eligibility for a particular benefit depends on information already
provided to the government on a tax return or through the withholding system. 58 Eligibility for
the EITC, for example, depends almost entirely on the income a taxpayer has earned over the
course of the year. Thus, setting up the EITC as a separate government program with a separate
administrative apparatus would be redundant and would needlessly require taxpayers to provide
the government with the same information twice. The intended beneficiaries may also be more
likely to claim a tax benefit than a direct spending benefit, because direct spending programs
may require jumping through more bureaucratic hoops or may entail the stigma of being labeled
a “welfare recipient.” 59
The key point that is emphasized throughout the literature and that underlies this paper is
not that all tax expenditures are bad policy or that tax expenditures are never an appropriate
policy tool. 60 Rather, the problem lies in the way the budget process and political dynamics
incentivize using tax expenditures to achieve policy objectives even when an alternative method
would be more fiscally responsible and less regressive.

III. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
The Budget Act defines “tax expenditures” as
those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow
a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide
a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability….61

57

CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 20; Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 368.
Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 369.
59
CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 20.
60
See, e.g., Toder, Evaluating, supra note 16, at 49 (“Labeling a program a tax expenditure does not itself say
whether it is a good or a bad program.”).
61
2 U.S.C. §622(3) (2006).
58
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While many tax provisions clearly fit within this definition, the meaning of “special” is
somewhat ambiguous. Historically, “special” was defined in reference to some baseline notion of
federal revenues. 62 That is, if the federal government was not “supposed” to be taxing a
particular activity or source of income in the first place, the exclusion of tax on that income has
not cost the government any forgone revenue. Thus, estimating the total level of tax expenditures
required a comparison to some sort of “normal” tax system. Not surprisingly, defining what is
the “normal” tax system, and thus what is a tax expenditure, has been a continuing source of
controversy. 63 Some conservatives objected that the very concept of tax expenditures implied
that all income intrinsically “belonged” to the federal government. 64 But most other critics
accept the underlying analytical insights of tax expenditure analysis, but criticize the normative
judgments necessary to design a “normal” tax baseline. 65
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 66 requires the Joint
House-Senate Committee on Taxation (JCT) to prepare an annual list of tax expenditures to
Congress. 67 For years, JCT prepared an estimate of the federal tax expenditure budget (TEB)

62

JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 20-24.
See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT. TAX. J. 244 (1969),
for the earliest academic criticism of the “normal” tax concept.
64
SCHICK, supra note 10, at 172; JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 35 (describing the “every last penny”
argument). See also JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 38, for a compelling rejoinder to this argument.
Specifically, tax expenditure analysis does not require an income tax at all, much less specify any particular rate
structure. Tax expenditure analysis takes as given the current system of progressive income taxation and the current
rate structure, and simply identifies specially targeted deviations from that general scheme. If tomorrow the current
income tax system were completely replaced with a straight national sales tax, with no special exceptions, the JCT
would conclude that tax expenditures totaled $0.
65
Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV.
863, 876 (2002) (“Although the [tax expenditure] concept itself is not especially controversial, arriving at a mutually
acceptable definition of what constitutes a tax expenditure has proven quite intractable.”). See JCT
RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 29-33 for a summary of academic criticisms of the traditional normal tax base.
66
Pub. L. 93-344 (1974).
67
Technically the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requires the Congressional Budget Office to
prepare those estimates, but subsequent provisions have required CBO to rely on the JCT’s figures due to that
Committee’s special expertise on taxation issues. See 2 U.S.C. §61(f); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012 n.2 (Comm. Print 2008),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-08.pdf.
63
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based on its own concept of a “normal” income tax. The JCT, as a nonpartisan committee, kept
this baseline consistent over the years. 68 Over the same period, the Department of Treasury has
also estimated a tax expenditure budget, but its methodology has changed from Administration to
Administration. 69 Lamenting being “[d]riven off track by seemingly endless debates about what
should and should not be included in the ‘normal’ tax base,” the JCT staff has recently developed
an innovative new conception of tax expenditures that captures the same information but does
not require comparison to a hypothetical baseline tax system. 70
The JCT’s new approach abolishes the idea of a “normal” tax baseline without losing any
analytical power. The JCT now identifies two types of tax expenditures: tax subsidies and taxinduced structural distortions. 71 Under the JCT’s definition, a tax subsidy is a provision of the
tax code that is “deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law
(and not some hypothetical “normal” tax).” 72 Thus, identifying a tax subsidy does not require a
normative judgment about what the tax system “should” be or what tax rules are “normal,” but is
defined solely by reference to the provisions of the tax code itself. 73 However, this new category
does not capture all of items the JCT had previously identified as tax expenditures. 74 JCT’s
second tax expenditure category of “tax-induced structural” distortions is defined not by
reference to any baseline, but includes any tax rule that creates economic allocative efficiency
losses. 75 This definition encompasses any inconsistency within the tax code that distorts
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economic incentives, but does not specify which method of resolving the inconsistency is
“correct.” 76 Most tax expenditures that present the most troubling accountability and equity
concerns are “tax subsidies” under the JCT’s new definition. 77 The JCT’s new definition in
practice makes little difference in terms of what tax provisions are counted as tax expenditures, 78
but hopefully the new definition will attract less criticism because it is based on more objective
criteria.
While critics may still quibble with the JCT’s approach, the key point is that the concept
of a tax expenditure is useful even without universal agreement as to what tax policies are
normatively superior. As the JCT correctly notes, the concept of tax expenditures is not, as some
conservatives charge, a philosophical commentary about the nature of the tax system—it is
merely an analytic tool for assessing the government’s fiscal commitment to various
programmatic objectives. Having a clear, consistent definition—any definition—is far more
important than the exact contours of any definition. 79 Once identified, tax expenditures can then
be assessed on their own merits. 80
For the purposes of the rest of this paper, I implicitly assume the JCT’s definition of tax
expenditures, but the reforms listed in the next section would be useful under any reasonable
76
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definition as long as it remains consistent and is not manipulated for short-term political gain.
Alternatively, the reforms I propose below could apply only to the “tax subsidies” category
developed by the JCT. That category is likely to capture the vast majority of items which are
troubling for equity or transparency reasons anyway, 81 and the “tax subsidy” category may prove
to be less politically controversial than the “tax-induced structural distortion” category (if only
because it is easier to understand).

IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
The reforms I propose below vary in their degree of current political viability. For the
most part, the more politically contentious proposals would also be the most effective at curbing
the growth of tax expenditures or increasing their transparency, accountability, and equity. But
the most viable proposals can still be very useful. Additionally, even a failed push for the more
aggressive proposals can help bring attention to the problems inherent in the use of tax
expenditures, and might spur greater self-discipline by Congress.

A. Default Refundability
Many of the most glaring downsides of tax expenditures described above 82 —notably lack
of transparency, accountability, and equity—are mitigated if the provisions are structured as
refundable tax credits rather than deductions or exclusions. First, refundable credits do not grant
a disproportionate benefit to higher income taxpayers because they are unaffected by marginal
rates and because credits may be taken advantage of by taxpayers who do not itemize.
Additionally, even the one-third of taxpayers who have no federal income tax liability can
81
82
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benefit from refundable credits. 83 For example, a deduction for the cost of installing home solar
panels would be worth more for a taxpayer in the 35% bracket than a taxpayer in the 25%
bracket, and would be worth nothing at all to taxpayers who do not itemize or who do not have
any income tax liability. But a refundable tax credit for 25% of the cost of solar panels would be
worth the same to every taxpayer regardless of circumstances. Additionally, the cost of
refundable tax credits to the government is more transparent. Unlike deductions and exclusions,
the repeal of which might push a taxpayer into a higher bracket or might cause a taxpayer to
begin claiming the standard deduction, 84 refundable credits will not otherwise affect a taxpayer’s
situation. In essence, a refundable credit is just a direct cash subsidy from the government—the
rest of the tax code is completely irrelevant to its implementation.
The use of refundable tax credits instead of more traditional tax devices like exclusions
and deductions has been growing, albeit slowly. The most important credit of this kind today is
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which provides tax benefits to lower-income workers as
they increase their wages and thereby reduce their entitlement to government social services
programs. Until 1975, there were no refundable tax credits, 85 and between 1975 and 1997, the
EITC was the only refundable credit. 86 As of the 2008 tax year, the tax code contained only three
refundable tax credits: the EITC, the Child Tax Credit (only partially refundable), and a small
refundable health insurance credit. 87 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(more commonly known as the “stimulus bill”) created a new “Making Work Pay” refundable
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tax credit that takes effect for the 2009 tax year. 88 But although the total number of refundable
tax credits still remains small, Congress has dramatically expanded the refundability of the EITC
and the Child Tax Credit over the past two decades, 89 and politicians from both parties have
proposed various refundable credits recently. 90 Indeed, in the 2008 Presidential Campaign,
refundable credit proposals were a centerpiece of the domestic agendas of both major party
candidates. 91
Despite these trends and the bipartisan support for refundability, 92 some strenuously
object to the refundability of tax credits because of the potential that individuals with no current
federal income tax liability could end up receiving a check from the government. 93 In response
to this criticism, Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag defend the refundability of tax credits on
grounds other than distributional equity, which they fear is subject to “deep partisan divides.” 94
Instead, Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag show that, in the vast majority of cases, refundable
credits are the most economically efficient means of subsidizing particular behavior through the
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tax code. 95 Specifically, because the benefit from a refundable credit is not dependent on a
taxpayer’s overall tax situation, a refundable credit perfectly mimics the classical economic idea
of a “Pigouvian subsidy” for an individual to engage in socially beneficial behavior. 96 Indeed,
even if the underlying activity subsidized is actually bad for society, a refundable credit ends up
less wasteful than a deduction or exclusion. 97
Thus, even with the potentially polarizing distributional issues of tax expenditures set
aside, the combination of efficiency and transparency justifications for refundable credits creates
a unique opportunity to expand the existing bipartisan support for this approach. Batchelder,
Goldberg, and Orszag argue that these justifications show that a refundable credit should be the
default for all tax incentives. 98 Bachelder, Goldberg and Orszag do not propose any particular
mechanism to enforce such a default, but the procedural rules of each house of Congress could
be modified to build the preference for refundable credits directly into the budget process. For
example, a rule could be passed in the House and Senate stating
It shall not be in order to consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, or
conference report which includes a new tax expenditure, unless that tax
expenditure is structured as a credit against tax imposed without any limitation
based on the amount of regular tax liability. 99
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Such a provision would also require a rule defining “tax expenditure,” either based on the
JCT’s definition or some other definition. 100 Again, a variety of possible definitions would be
acceptable. A definition based on the JCT’s “tax subsidy” concept might read something like “A
tax expenditure is a provision providing for a new deduction, exclusion from income, or credit
against income tax due that is inconsistent with the current Internal Revenue Code.” 101 Such a
definition would necessarily require the parliamentarian to exercise some degree of judgment on
close calls, but this is already true with respect to enforcement of budget reconciliation rules, for
example. 102 Additionally, classifying a new provision as a tax expenditure is likely to be a much
less controversial exercise than discriminating between existing provisions, since there is a clear
baseline for comparison (i.e., the existing code).
This rule could then be enforced by any member on the floor with a point of order. The
effectiveness of a point of order as an enforcement mechanism is mitigated to the extent that a
point of order may be waived, either by a vote of the entire body or through a special rule passed
by the House Rules Committee. 103 Although budget rules can be circumvented relatively easily
by the majority in the House, rules typically have more bite in the Senate where a three-fifths
majority is required to waive most points of order, 104 and so these mechanisms can still provide a
meaningful constraint on the temptation to enact policy through the tax code. Even though such
budget rules have certainly been manipulated over the years,105 they have provided a net positive
force for fiscal discipline, 106 and thus the use of these familiar procedural tools holds some
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promise for constraining the temptation to enact more and more federal policy through the tax
code.
In some cases, making a tax expenditure refundable may be infeasible, either politically
or practically. But in those cases, the procedural rules proposed here will create an incentive for
designing such programs as direct or discretionary spending rather than as a tax break, as they
ordinarily should be absent an independent efficiency justification. 107

B. Limited Deductibility for Top Brackets
A less dramatic, but also less effective, means of limiting the expansion of tax
expenditures than default refundability would be to create default rules which limit the extent to
which any deduction or exclusion can be claimed by a taxpayer. For instance, President Obama’s
first budget proposed limiting the extent to which wealthier taxpayers could claim certain
itemized deductions. 108 Under the proposal, certain deductions would count only as if the
taxpayer were in the 28% tax bracket, in essence making the deductions function a little bit more
like non-refundable credits. Applying these same ideas to future tax expenditures would limit
their costs and their regressive effects to some degree, albeit less than if the expenditures were
instead structured as refundable credits. 109 This weaker measure could be enforced in the same
manner as the default refundable credits option. For example, the rule might instead state “It
shall not be in order to consider a bill, or an amendment to any bill, adding any new tax
deduction, unless the tax deduction is limited such that no taxpayer may claim the deduction as if
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their marginal rate were greater than 28%.” The applicable percent could instead be replaced
with a more flexible reference like “as if they were subject to the third highest marginal rate,” to
accommodate future marginal rate changes.
Even this proposal is likely to be somewhat controversial. Congress and the charitable
organization community reacted particularly coolly to the Obama Administration’s proposal to
limit the deductibility of charitable deductions, 110 in spite of evidence that suggested that the
proposal would have a negligible effect on charitable giving rates.111 An amendment opposing
the change for charitable deductions passed the Senate 94-3, 112 and the final fiscal year 2010
budget resolution did not include the proposal. 113 But the proposal would likely engender much
less opposition if it only applied to new tax credits rather than existing credits which have
already built up strong constituencies. Even with this limitation, the proposal would still serve as
an effective check on the future proliferation of tax deductions.

C. Inclusion in the Outlay Totals
Perhaps the simplest measure to constrain the growth of tax expenditures would be to
include tax expenditures in the annual budget as part of total outlays rather than as decreases to
revenues. A more modest change supported by the GAO would be for OMB to include tax
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expenditure revenue losses alongside outlay totals in the President’s budget. 114 OMB actually
began taking this approach for the fiscal year 1998 budget, but the policy was discontinued for
the fiscal year 2002 budget. 115 While in some sense such a change would be entirely cosmetic—
just moving a number from the revenue to the spending side of the ledger—it would have
important political implications. First, more accessible information about the scope and nature of
tax expenditures might deter their overuse. 116 Second, since tax expenditures would be counted
as spending, no longer would a member of Congress be able to claim credit for both cutting taxes
and cutting spending merely by shifting more federal spending to the tax code.
Including all tax expenditures in the outlay totals would also remove the disincentive in
current law to structuring tax expenditures as refundable credits. Presently, most tax expenditures
are reflected in the budget totals only through decreased projected revenues. However, the
refundable portion of refundable credit provisions appears in the budget as an outlay. 117 Thus, a
member who structures his or her program as a refundable credit can be derided for “increasing
spending,” while a member who structures his or her subsidy proposal as a less transparent and
more regressive tax deduction is championed as a tax cutter.

D. Sunset Rules
Unlike discretionary appropriations and authorizations, which typically last a definite
period of time such as one year, a tax expenditure remains until repealed or until it “sunsets” by
its own provisions. If a tax expenditure does not contain a sunset, then Congress has no set
114
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opportunity to revisit the provision to assess its effectiveness. If Congress must renew a tax
provision, it at least has an opportunity to reconsider the law “in light of increasing fiscal
concerns, renewed caution, or other relevant post-enactment developments.” 118 To encourage
more tax expenditures to be subject to this constant renewal process, yet another House and
Senate rule could be created that prohibits consideration of any tax expenditure that lasts longer
than a specified length of time.
However, adding sunsets to tax expenditures creates many additional problems. First,
sunsets may complicate tax planning, and thus reduce the benefit of any expiring tax
provision. 119 Second, sunsets can allow politicians to continuously extract political rents from
constituencies that benefit from tax expenditures since these groups must constantly lobby for
renewal. 120 Additionally, in practice many tax expenditures are routinely extended again and
again despite their sunset provisions. As of 2006, only two tax “extender” provisions have ever
been allowed to expire. 121 In practice, many extremely popular provisions that Congress has
every intention of extending repeatedly are given sunsets not to increase accountability, but in
order to comply with PAYGO rules. 122 Because a permanent repeal would require too many
offsets, it is often more politically expedient for Congress to only extend a provision for a few
years at a time. 123 Because the CBO is required to assume current law when making its longterm fiscal projections, this strategy can have the consequence of reducing budgetary
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transparency and hiding the true long-term fiscal impact of tax cuts. 124 Piecemeal sunsets also
make it politically easier to allow tax benefits for low-income families to slowly disappear. 125
In practice, PAYGO and the Senate’s Byrd Rule already create strong incentives for tax
expenditures to sunset. 126 Given these existing structural incentives, and given the fact that many
tax expenditures are routinely extended anyway, 127 an additional rule requiring sunsets would
probably not be particularly effective by itself in reducing tax expenditures or increasing their
accountability, and could bring other downsides. 128 However, even if a structural solution is not
appropriate here, when enacting new tax expenditures Congress should carefully consider the
transparency and accountability implications of adding sunsets. If a provision is designed as a
short-term or experimental replacement for a discretionary program, sunsets can make tax
expenditures receive a level of accountability and oversight more on par with their discretionary
spending cousins. But if the expenditure is clearly intended to become a permanent feature of the
tax code, sunsets only obscure the true long-run fiscal impact of a provision.

E. Require Prior Authorization by Authorizing Committees
The solution to the growth of tax expenditures that would require the most revolutionary
change to the budget process would be to require that tax expenditures be “authorized” before
being passed by a tax-writing committee, in much the same way that discretionary spending must
be authorized before being appropriated by the appropriations committees. This approach in
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essence treats tax expenditures like any other spending, requiring a two-step approval process
before a tax expenditure can become law. For example, Rule XXI(2)(a)(1) of the Rules of the
House states “An appropriation may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not
be in order as an amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously authorized by law….” 129
A parallel rule for tax expenditures might state “A tax expenditure may not be reported in any
bill, and may not be in order as an amendment, unless previously authorized by law.” Again, this
rule would also need to be accompanied by a rule defining tax expenditures. 130
Requiring tax expenditures to be authorized would have a number of important
advantages. First, it would place tax expenditures on an equal procedural footing with ordinary
spending, thus eliminating an artificial political incentive for a member to use the tax code rather
than the appropriations process to achieve a particular policy objective. Second, authorizing
committees may have greater (or, at the very least, different) substantive expertise regarding the
policy objective at issue. The members of the tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee,
for instance, could benefit from the insight of members on the House Energy and Commerce
Committee (which has jurisdiction over health care programs) when it comes to the policy merits
of tax expenditures for health insurance. Requiring authorization of each tax expenditures would
give the authorizing committees ownership of each provision, and would create an additional
point for oversight and accountability. Presumably, an authorizing committee would hold
oversight hearings over the administration of tax expenditures within their jurisdiction before reauthorizing them, just as those committees hold hearings before re-authorizing direct spending
programs.
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Most importantly, the authorization process would also facilitate direct consideration of
whether a particular policy objective is most efficiently achieved through a tax expenditure or a
direct expenditure. Currently, even if either a tax writing committee or an authorizing committee
believed a tax expenditure would be better structured as discretionary spending, a bill to replace
the tax expenditure with an appropriation would be required to move through multiple
committees. 131 This hurdle adds inertia to the system, and incentivizes proponents of a particular
policy objective to leave well enough alone and not challenge whether a goal is best achieved
through the tax code or through discretionary spending. Requiring all tax expenditures to be
authorized periodically would force authorizing committees to explicitly consider the trade-off
between tax expenditures and annual appropriations. An authorizing committee that chooses not
to re-authorize a tax expenditure within its jurisdiction would then free up funds that could be
used to support other programs under its umbrella instead.
Requiring all tax expenditures to be authorized before passage by the tax writing
committees might also eliminate an implicit disincentive for the tax writing committees to use
refundable credits rather than more regressive methods. Although Congress agreed in the 1970s
that the EITC should be solely within the jurisdiction of the tax writing committees, those
committees may remain fearful that other oversight committees would demand jurisdiction over
any new refundable credit provisions. 132 If all tax expenditures, regardless of form, required
authorization by other committees anyway, perhaps the tax writing committees would feel more
freedom to structure such provisions optimally, rather than in a way that preserves their “turf.”
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The most glaring downside to this proposal is that the tax writing committees can be
expected to strenuously resist any effort to dilute their authority over tax expenditures. 133 On the
other hand, every other committee is likely to be pleased by the added lever they would gain over
tax policy. To make the proposal more palatable to the tax writing committees, the tax writing
committees could be granted authorizing authority over some subset of existing tax expenditures.
For instance, the House Ways and Means Committee could be given authorizing jurisdiction
over deductions for charitable giving. If this were the case, the Ways and Means Committee
would be responsible for both authorizing the charitable giving deduction and enacting it into the
tax code. More comprehensively, all existing tax expenditures could be grandfathered into the
new system by giving the tax writing committees jurisdiction over all of them. Only new tax
expenditures would be subjected to authorization by other committees of jurisdiction. This
compromise would also please constituencies that benefit from existing tax expenditures. Of
course, this compromise eliminates the advantages of the proposal for each tax expenditure for
which the tax writing committees retain authorizing jurisdiction.
Even if the tax committees successfully shoot down this proposal, perhaps a concerted
assault on their jurisdiction will at least inspire those committees to be more thoughtful about the
future proliferation of tax expenditures. Alternatively, even a failed battle for this more
comprehensive solution may pave the way for some of the less dramatic solutions proposed
herein.

F. Distribution-Weighted PAYGO
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Although tax expenditures are not included as outlays in the budget, their growth is
constrained to a degree by PAYGO rules. But because tax expenditures tend to have a regressive
effect, 134 and because tax expenditures are likely to be offset by decreasing spending programs
which have progressive effects, 135 Linda Sugin argues that PAYGO rules are insufficient to
protect the poor from regressive policy shifts. 136 She proposes that to compensate for this effect,
Congress adopt a PAYGO system that is weighted for distributional impacts. In Sugin’s
proposal, “[t]ax cuts that decrease inequality could be subject to lower procedural hurdles than
tax cuts that increase inequality.” 137
Sugin argues that “details are not crucial to this idea,” and only very generally outlines
how her proposal might be structured. 138 Implementation would obviously require some
benchmark for progressivity, but these sorts of analyses are routinely conducted using measures
such as the Suits progressivity index 139 or calculations of changes in after-tax income for highincome and low-income taxpayers. 140 It is true that implementation would require CBO to
project these distributional impacts before floor consideration of any proposed tax change, but
the CBO scorekeeping already requires substantial guesswork, and as long as the estimate is not
tainted by political considerations the process can still provide some measure of fiscal
discipline. 141 If the measure chosen shows that the proposed change in tax law would be
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Sugin, supra note 69, at 1262-66.
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Id. at 1264.
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Id. at n.26 and accompanying text.
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HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 23; see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration,
2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1186-89 (2004) (defending the use of change in after-tax income as the proper
basis for assessing progressivity); HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 2 (analyzing the distributive impact of tax
expenditures based on change in after-tax income).
141
See Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1574-75 (explaining that even though CBO scores of legislation are merely
an “educated best guess” that “no one is under any illusion…will prove to be correct,” the CBO score is still a
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regressive (for example, if the Suits progressivity index for the change is negative, or if the
projected change in after-tax income is lower for the bottom quintile of taxpayers than the top
quintile, etc.) then the measure would require a supermajority for passage. Although she does not
explicitly propose this, Sugin’s proposal could also be applied to tax cuts for businesses, thus
requiring a supermajority to pass tax breaks that disproportionately benefit big corporations at
the expense of small businesses. This PAYGO rule could still exclude any change, even if
progressive, that increases the deficit. The key is that even strictly deficit-neutral legislation
should require a supermajority for passage if it is particularly regressive.
This solution is not attractive solely for its distributional impacts. Distribution-weighted
PAYGO would create a strong incentive for members to structure their tax proposals as
refundable credits rather than deductions or exclusions because a refundable credit would be
more likely to pass through the progressivity screen. 142 Still, as the most explicitly equity-based
reform proposal here, this proposal is the most unlikely to attract wide bipartisan support and to
thus create an enduring political norm against tax expenditures. But even if a distributionweighted PAYGO system adopted by the current Democratic congress were to be summarily
reversed down the line by a Republican congress, its use in the interim could cause politicians
and the voters they serve to re-think their knee-jerk preference for targeted tax cuts for enacting
social policy. Additionally, a push for such rule changes could bring to the fore the distributional
biases in the budget process and make equity concerns more explicitly part of the annual budget
battle.

“necessary fiction for budgeting and legislating”). But see Block, supra note 65, for a description of how CBO
scores can be manipulated, a problem that would have to be carefully monitored under a distribution-weighted
PAYGO system as well.
142
See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the equity, efficiency, and transparency implications of refundable credits
vis-à-vis other types of tax expenditures.
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CONCLUSION
As the debate over the Nation’s long-term fiscal health rages on, controlling tax
expenditures must be part of the conversation. Tax expenditures represent an increasingly large
portion of federal commitments, and the current budget rules create strong incentives for elected
officials to spend money through the tax code rather than through the appropriations process.
This trend is disturbing not only because of the part it plays in the projected long-term federal
deficits, but also because tax spending is inherently more regressive and subject to less
transparency and accountability. A single-minded focus only on reform of entitlement spending
programs like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security to the exclusion of the need for tax
expenditure reform will not only miss a key component of the fiscal dilemma, but will also leave
us with a government that is less transparent and accountable and less attentive to the needs of
the most vulnerable in society.
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